






The Understanding and Goal 
of Platonic Philosophizing
Abstract
The questions of philosophical understanding and justice are essentially interrelated from 
the very beginnings of the Greek philosophizing. Just as the philosophical hermeneutics 
or hJrmeneiva has its prephilosophical origin in the Greek god Hermes, the Platonic under-
standing of justice (dikaiosuvnh) has it in the goddess Dike. In his ambivalency Hermes thus 
indicates the possibility of understanding as well as the possibility of misleadance or misuse 
of understanding, which – in the horizon of Socratic and Platonic philosophy – means the 
same as lack of understanding. In the Platonic philosophy the cognition and ethical attitude 
are namely closely related. But if the ethical attitude is understood mostly as righteous-
ness, the latter shouldn’t be understood in the somewhat reduced meaninf of accordance of 
human actions with the state laws; what we have to deal with is the inner accordance and 
harmony of man and his soul, and this also means the accordance of man with the world 
he lives in From this point of view the potential hermeneutical an-archism” can once again 
– this time in another way – be pointed towards the question of ajrchv and transposed from 
the sphere of mere theory into the very being of human life, which is – in the Platonic phi-






















































relation	between	mythos	and	 logos	 in	 the	ancient	world;	 this	 relation	most	
definitely	cannot	be	reduced	to	attack	against	mythos,	launched	in	the	name	




















1. Hermes – god of hermeneutics?
I. Hermes and hermeneia











This	 etymological	 relatedness	 of	 hermeneutics	 and	 Hermes	 has	 also	 been	
criticized;	some	are	not	ready	to	acknowledge	the	Olympian	roots	of	herme-
neutics,	 but	 prefer	 to	 relate	Hermes	 to	Hermetism.	This	 connection	 is	 un-
doubtedly	legitimate	as	well,	for	it	holds	true	that	–	as	Mircea	Eliade	says	in	



























Wilhelm	Weischedel,	 Der Gott der Philos-
ophen,	 Wissenschaftliche	 Buchgesellschaft, 
Darmstadt	1994,	Vol.	1,	p.	39.
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heit	 und	 Täuschung	 bei	 Platon”,	 in:	 Di-
eter	Henrich et	al. (ed.),	Die Gegenwart der 






Mircea	Eliade,	A	History of Religious Ideas,	




M.	Eliade,	A	History of Religious Ideas, p.	276.
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Let	us	 try	 to	answer	 this	question	by	means	of	some	principal	activities	of	
Hermes,	without	pretending	to	exhaust	all	of	his	aspects.
Hermes	is	always	on	the	way.	We	sometimes	say	that	he	is	the	god	of	roads	





























knowing,	 or	 consciously,	with	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 joy.	Hermes	 is	 namely	 also	
the	god	of	cunning	and	luck	(also	financial),	which	might	be	derived	from	
this;	 he	 is	 thus	 also	 the	 god	 of	 trade	 and	 thieves.	Walter	Otto	 emphasizes	
that	in	Hermes	we	always	have	to	deal	with	the	relation	between	profit	and	



























see	Franci	Zore,	Početak i smisao metafizičkih 
pitanja. Studije o povijesti grčke filozofije,	
Demetra,	Zagreb	2006,	p.	85	ff.
12
Abbreviations	 of	 ancient	 works	 are	 quoted	
according	 to:	H.	G.	Liddell	 –	R.	Scott	 –	H.	
S.	 Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon.	 With	 a	
Supplement	 1968	 (Ninth	 Edition	 reprinted),	
Oxford University	Press,	Oxford	1977.
13
Walter	 F.	 Otto,	 Die Götter Griechenlands.	
Das Bild des Göttlichen im Spiegel des grie-
chischen Geistes,	 Suhrkamp,	 Frankfurt	 am	
Main	 92002,	 pp.	 149–150.	 –	Also	 important	
here	is	the	relation	between	Hermes	and	Hes-
tia,	which	shows	how	“all	our	experience	of	




































2. Justice (dikaiosuvnh) as the goal of philosophy
Nowadays17	it	is	extremely	difficult	to	talk	about	justice	in	general	and	justice	
by	Plato,	 since	we	 are	overwhelmed	by	modern	meanings	of	 these	words,	
which	seem	 to	be	 in	 inflationary	use	 in	everyday	public	 speech.	Therefore	
I	think	that	special	attention	should	be	paid	to	ancient	Greek	understanding	










but	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 striving	 for	 the	 comprehension	 of	man	 and	 hu-
man	soul	(yuchv)	and	its	formation	(paideiva).	Saying	that	Dike	is	Justice	and	












cal	discourse	 is	namely	also	closely	related	 to	 the	meaning	of	dikaiosuvnh	
as	 the	possibility	of	“political	being”,	 i.e.	of	people	 living	 in	a	community	
(povli~).







all	human	affairs	–	Divkhn […] jOrfeu;~ para; to;n tou` Dio;~ qrovnon fhsi; 
kaqhmevnhn pavnta ta; tw`n ajnqrwvpwn ejfora`n.20












ejpei; ou[ti se moi`ra kakh; prou[pempe nevesqai
thvndÆ oJdovn (h\ ga;r ajpÆ ajnqrwvpwn ejkto;~ pavtou ejstivn),
ajlla; qevmi~ te divkh te.23
16
Bill	 Crouse,	 “Deconstructionism:	 The	 Post-





derstanding	 of	 Justice.	On	divkh	 and	dikai-
osuvnh	 in	 Greek	 Philosophy”,	 in:	 Damir	
Barbarić	(ed.),	Platon über das Gute und die 
Gerechtigkeit,	 Königshausen	 &	 Neumann,	
Würzburg	2005,	pp.	21–30.
18
H.-G.	 Gadamer,	 “Das	 Vaterbild	 im	 grie-
chischen	Denken”,	in:	H.-G.	Gadamer,	Grie-





mente der Vorsokratiker,	 Vol.	 1,	 (19.	Aufl.;	




the	 editors	 indicate	 as	 genuine,	 since	 the	
source	signifies	only	indirect	quotations.
21
see	Od.	19.43:	au{th toi divkh ejsti; qew`n, 
oi} [Olumpon e[cousin,	 “is	 the	way	 of	 the	
gods	 that	 hold	 Olympus”,	 and	 Od	 11.218:	
ajllÆ au{th divkh ejsti; brotw`n, o{te tiv~ 
ke qavnh/sin,	“this	is	the	appointed	way	with	
mortals	when	one	dies”;	cf.	also	the	line	Od	
4.691:	h{ tÆ ejsti; divkh qeivwn basilhvwn,	
“as	 the	 wont	 is	 of	 divine	 kings”	 (English	
translation	 by	A.T.	Murray).	 –	 On	 different	
lexical	meanings	of	divkh,	some	of	which	are	




iste,	Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-eu-






















deuvteron hjgavgeto liparh;n Qevmin, h} tevken {Wra~,
Eujnomivhn te Divkhn te kai; Eijrhvnhn teqalui`an,
ai{ tÆ e[rgÆ wjreuvousi kataqnhtoi`si brotoi`si.26
“Next	he	married	bright	Themis	who	bore	the	Horae	(Hours),	and	Eunomia	(Order),	Dike	(Ju-
stice),	and	blooming	Eirene	(Peace),	who	mind	the	works	of	mortal	men.”27
According	 to	other	sources,	Horae	also	express	 life	and	growth;	 in	 the	At-
tic	 cult,	 for	 example,	 there	 exist	Thallo	 (Qallwv;	 Blossom),	Auxo	 (Aujxwv;	
Growth)	and	Carpo	(Karpwv;	Fruits).28


































‘according	 to	necessity;	 for	 they	pay	penalty	and	 retribution	 to	each	other	 for	 their	 injustice	
according	to	the	assessment	of	Time’”,	kata; to; crewvn: didovnai ga;r aujta; divkhn kai; 














Philosophers. A Critical History with a Selec-
tion of Texts,	 Cambridge	 University	 Press, 
Cambridge	21988,	p.	243.
25
See	 DK	 28	 B	 1,	 11–14.	 –	More	 about	 this	
later.
26
Th.	 901–2.	 Hesiod,	 Theogony,	 Edited	 with	




English	 translation	 by	 Hugh	 G.	 Evelyn-
White.
28
Pausanias	 (9.35.2)	 for	 example	 reports:	 to; 
ga;r th`~ Karpou`~ ejsti;n ouj Cavrito~ ajl-
la; {Wra~ o[noma th/` de; eJtevra/ tw`n JWrw`n 
nevmousin oJmou` th/` Pandrovsw/ tima;~ oiJ 







For	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 natural	 and	
the	posited	see	Felix	Heinimann,	Nomos und 
Physis. Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Anti-




along	 with	 the	 Greek	 essence	 of	 being	 as	
fuvsi~.”	 Martin	 Heidegger,	 Einführung in 
die Metaphysik	 (Gesammtausgabe,	Vol.	 40),	
Suhrkamp,	Frankfurt	am	Main	1983,	p.	109.
31
As	 for	 example	 by	Aristotle,	 whose	 limited	
understanding	of	fuvsi~	defines	also	the	Aris-









H.	 G.	 Liddell	 –	 R.	 Scott	 –	 H.	 S.	 Jones, A 
Greek-English Lexicon,	pp.	429–430.
33






and	Alfred	Verdross,	Grundlinien der antiken 
Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie,	 Springer,	
Wien	1948.
35
English	 translation	 from:	G.	 S.	Kirk	 –	 J.	E.	
Raven	–	M.	Schofield,	A Critical History with 
a Selection of Texts,	p.	118.
36







in	Parmenides’	poem,	where	–	 together	with	Themis	–	 she	 is	 the	guide	on	
the	path	towards	the	Truth.37	Dike	also	possesses	the	keys	of	day	and	night	
and	guards	their	“door”.38	Divkh	here	also	means,	according	to	Heidegger,	the	
accord,	 “the	 overwhelming	 accordance”.39	Only	 through	 the	 “door”	 of	 the	
goddess	Dike	leads	the	path	to	the	Truth:	only	the	accord	of	night	and	day	is	





By	Heraclitus,	 Dike,	 with	 the	 help	 of	 Erinyes,	 holds	measure	 to	 the	 Sun:	
Ἥlio~ ga;r oujc uJperbhvsetai mevtra: eij de; mhv, jErinuve~ min Divkh~ 
ejpivkouroi ejxeurhvsousin.	“Sun	will	not	overstep	his	measures;	otherwise	
the	Erinyes,	ministers	 of	 Justice,	will	 find	 him	 out.”	 (DK	22	B	 94)40	The	
emphasis	 is	 here	 placed	on	 the	 cosmic	measure	Dike	 takes	 care	 of,	 but	 at	
the	same	time	on	the	way	of	retribution;	this	is	taken	care	of	by	the	Erinyes,	









and	Xenophon	 (also	within	 the	 “Socratic”	 context)	 and	 later	 by	Aristotle,	











ejn de; dikaiosuvnh/ sullhvbdhn pa`sÆ ajrethv Æsti,
pa`~ dev tÆ ajnh;r ajgaqov~, Kuvrne, divkaio~ ejwvn.
“Righteousness	containeth	the	sum	of	all	virtue;	and	every	righteous	man,	Cyrnus,	is	good.”43
Although	the	Greek	elegy	transfers	us	to	another	–	pre-philosophical	–	level,	
we	can	find	already	here	 the	basic	relations	between	dikaiosuvnh, ajrethv, 









































tov~ te kai; [Hmatov~ eijsi keleuvqwn, […]	
tw`n de; Divkh poluvpoino~ e[cei klhi`da~ 
ajmoibouv~. “There	are	the	gates	of	the	paths	
of	Night	and	Day	[…]	and	avenging	Justice	
holds	 the	 alternative	 bolts.”	 (English	 trans-
lation	 from:	G.	 S.	Kirk	 –	 J.	 E.	Raven	 –	M.	
Schofield,	 The Presocratic Philosophers. A 
Critical History with a Selection of Texts,	p.	
243.)
39
M.	Heidegger,	Einführung in die Metaphysik,	
p.	174.
40
English	 translation	 from:	G.	 S.	Kirk	 –	 J.	E.	
Raven	–	M.	Schofield,	The Presocratic Phi-







platonischen	 ‘Lysis’”,	 in:	 H.-G.	 Gadamer,	
Griechische Philosophie II (Gesammelte	
Werke,	 Vol.	 6),	 Mohr,	 Tübingen	 1985,	 pp.	
171–186,	here	p.	175.
43
The	 Elegiac	 Poems	 of	 Theognis,	 Book	 I,	





–	Tiv devÉ swvfrona ouj th/` filiva/ kai; sum-
fwniva/ th/` aujtw`n touvtwn, o{tan tov te 
a[rcon kai; tw; ajrcomevnw to; logistiko;n 
oJmodoxw`si dei`n a[rcein kai; mh; stasiά-
zwsin aujtw/`É –	Swfrosuvnh gou`n, h\ dÆ o{~, 
oujk a[llo tiv ejstin h] tou`to, povlewv~ te 
kai; ijdiwvtou. –	ÆAlla; me;n dh; divkaiov~ ge, 
















de; ajei; sunevpetai divkh tw`n ajpoleipomevnwn tou` qeivou novmou timwrov~	
(Lg.	716	A	2–3).	Proclus	equates	this	god	with	Plato’s	Demiurg,	adding	in	his	
Platonic Theology	that	Demiurg	“arranges	and	adorns	by	justice	all	celestial	
and	sublunary	natures”	–	pavnta th/` Divkh/, tav te oujravnia kai; ta; uJpo; 
selhvnhn, diakosmw`n (Theol. Plat.	5.89).47	The	relationship	between	cos-
mological	and	ethical	aspect	is	undoubtedly	evident	again:	the	beautiful	order	
of	the	world	(kovsmo~)	includes	also	man	as	part	of	the	world.
Understanding	dikaiosuvnh	 as	 symphony	 implies	 also	 the	 “punitive”	 –	 or,	
better	 said,	 “catharsic”	–	 function	of	divkh and	dikaiosuvnh;	Plato	 thus	 in	
Phaidon says	 that	 justice	 and	virtue	 are	 a	 kind	of	kavqarsi~,	 purification:	
to; dÆ ajlhqe;~ tw/` o[nti h/\ kavqarsiv~ ti~ tw`n toiouvtwn pavntwn	[sc. 
fovbwn, hJdonw`n ktl.] kai; hJ swfrosuvnh kai; hJ dikaiosuvnh kai; ajn-











If	we	understand	 the	“Good”	of	Plato’s	to; ajgaqovn	 as	any	good,	good	 in	
every	sense	and	first	of	all	as	“what	is	qualified	and	what	qualifies	for	some-
thing”,50	 then	we	 can	 clearly	 see	 the	 essential	 connection	 between	to; aj-
gaqovn	and	ajrethv,	first	of	all	dikaiosuvnh.	In	this	sense,	the	Good	and	Jus-
tice,	understood	in	the	above	meaning,	are	first	of	all	integral	and	originally	




In	spite	of	certain	changes	 that	 take	place	 in	Greek	philosophy	 in	 the	next	
centuries,	 the	 basic	 understanding	 is	 preserved	 until	 the	 late-antique	Neo-
Platonism,	as	we	have	already	demonstrated	in	some	cases.	As	far	as	this	is	
concerned,	we	can	find	instructive	insights	in	Proclus’	treatment	of	Horae	at	
the	very	end	of	the	ancient	Greek	philosophy.	In	his	Commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus, he	says	that	the	daughters	of	Themis,	“from	which	the	whole	order	



























which	 is,	 still	 unachieved,	 perverted	 into	 its	 own	negativity;	 before	 it	 gets	
unconcealed,	it	already	conceals	itself.	Not	into	nothing,	but	into	nothingness	
of	its	own	becoming	a	doxa.52










See	 for	 example	Lg.	 630	E	 2,	 899	B	 6	 and	
La.	 199	E	4	 (suvmpasa ajrethv,	 rather	 than	
movrion ajreth`~).	Such	understanding	can	be	
traced	 also	 in	Aristotle:	au{th me;n ou\n hJ 
dikaiosuvnh ouj mevro~ ajreth`~ ajllÆ o{lh 
ajrethv ejstin	(EN	1130	a	8–9).
47
English	translation:	Proclus,	The Theology of 









Dike	 refers	 only	 to	 the	 former:	kaqartikh; 




Martin	 Heidegger,	 “Platons	 Lehre	 von	 der	





sage	 –	 unfortunately	 we	 cannot	 study	 it	 in	
more	detail	here	–	runs	as	follows	(italics	F.	
Z.):	{Oti	triẁn	oujsẁn	tẁn	mesothvtwn, gew-
metrikh̀~, ajriqmhtikh̀~, mousikh̀~, ἡ me;n 
sterea; ajnalogiva hJ ejk tw`n triw`n sugke-
imevnh	ijsovth~ th`~ Qevmido~, ajfÆ h|~ pa`sa 
tavxi~, aiJ de; trei`~ tw`n triw`n qugat-
evrwn, Eujnomiva~ Divkh~ kai; Eijrήnh~: hJ 
ajriqmhtikh; th`~ Eijrhvnh~, tw/` i[sw/ uJpere-
couvsh~ kai; uJperecomevnh~, h/| kai; ejn 
toi`~ sunallavgmasi crwvmeqa ejn eijrhvnh/, 
diÆ h}n kai; ta; stoicei`a hjremei`: hJ de; 
gewmetrikh; th`~ Eujnomiva~, h}n kai; Dio;~ 
krivsin oJ Plavtwn prosagoreuvei, diÆ h|~ 
gewmetrikai`~ ajnalogivai~ kekovsmhtai 
oJ kovsmo~: hJ de; aJrmonikh; th`~ Divkh~, 





































of	 philosophy.	This	 problem	accompanies	philosophy	 from	 the	very	begin-
ning:	distinguishing	between	the	genuine	philosophy	and	what	is	only	called	
that	way.	This	is	what	Plato	speaks	about	when	he	makes	distinction	between	
philosophers	and	the	“actors”	of	wisdom	and	(mimhth;~ w]n tẁn o[ntwn,	“the	
imitator	of	beings”,	Sph.	235	A	1,	and	mimhth;~ dÆ w]n toù sofou',	“the	imi-
tator	of	wisdom”,	ibid.	268	C	1)	or	non-philosophers	(oJ mh; filovsofo~, Ti.,	
47	B	4)	or	what	Aristotle	has	in	mind	when	he	discerns	between	philosophers	
on	 one	 side	 and	 “dialecticians”	 and	 sophists	 on	 the	 other:	shmeìon	dev:	oiJ 
ga;r dialektikoi; kai; sofistai; to; aujto; me;n uJpoduvontai sch̀ma tw/` 
filosovfw/: hJ ga;r sofistikh; fainomevnh movnon sofiva ejsti (Metaph.	
G	2,	1004	b	18).	Philosophy	“tends”	–	in	its	own	reduction	–	to	be	transformed	






















ajrchv,	 but	 also	about	 the	untrue,	 false	viz.	perverted	“ajrchv”.	The	 latter	of	












“to	 someone’s	detriment”.	As	Heraclitus	would	put	 it:	ajqavnatoi qnhtoiv, 





referring	 to	“Hermes”.	These	are	expressions	 such	as	practice	 (gumnasiva)	
and	 play	 (paidiav),	 and	 also	 the	 question	 of	 the	 reach	 of	 “Socratic”	 irony	
(eijrwneiva).	Excessive	emphasis	of	these	elements	may	result	in	an	impres-
sion	that	Plato	is	 interested	only	in	dialectics	as	an	empty	method,	or	even	






(tov te ajlhqe;~ eJkavstwn),	but	also	about	the	knowledge	of	the	nature	of	








On	 this	 see	 for	 example	 Franci	 Zore,	 “The	
Platonic	 vision	 of	 the	 aesthetic	 world	 and	
the	 aesthetization	 of	 the	 world	 nowadays”,	
Cronikav Aijsqhtikh`~ / Annales d’esthétique 
/ Annals for Aesthetics,	vol.	41A	(2002),	pp.	
179–186.
54
“What	 is	 the	 truth?”	 (Jn.	 18,	 38),	 cf.	Hans-
Georg	Gadamer,	“Was	ist	Wahrheit”,	in:	Wahr-
heit und Methode II	(Gesammelte	Werke,	Vol.	
2),	Mohr,	Tübingen	21993,	p.	44	ff.;	F.	Zore,	
Početak i smisao metafizičkih pitanja. Studije 
o povijesti grčke filozofije,	p.	102	ff.
55
English	 translation	 from:	G.	 S.	Kirk	 –	 J.	E.	
Raven	–	M.	Schofield, The Presocratic Phi-
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Razumijevanje i cilj platoničkog filozofiranja
Sažetak
Pitanja filozofskog razumijevanja i pravednosti bitno su povezana od samih početaka grčkog 
filozofiranja. Baš kao što filozofska heremenutika ili hJrmeneiva ima svoj pretfilozofski izvor u 
grčkome bogu Hermesu, platoničko razumijevanje pravednosti (dikaiosuvnh) ima ga u božici 
Dike. U svojoj ambivalentnosti Hermes tako naznačuje mogućnost razumijevanja kao i moguć-
nosti zavođenja ili zloupotrebe razumijevanja, koje – u horizontu sokratičke i platoničke filozo-
fije – znači zapravo nedostatak razumijevanja. U platoničkoj filozofiji, naime, spoznaja i etički 
stav blisko su povezani. Ali ako se taj etički stav ponajvećma razumije kao pravičnost, potonja 
se ne smije razumjeti u ponešto reduciranom značenju slaganja ljudskih djelovanja s državnim 
zakonima; ono čime se trebamo baviti jest unutarnje slaganje i harmonija čovjeka i njegove 
duše, a što također znači slaganje čovjeka sa svijetom u kojemu živi. S tog gledišta, potencijalni 
hermeneutički ‘an-arhizam’ može se ponovno – ovoga puta drukčije – usmjeriti prema pitanju 
ajrchv i transponirati iz sfere puke teorije u samo biće ljudskoga života, koje se – u platoničkoj 





Verständnis und Ziel des platonischen Denkens
Zusammenfassung
Die Fragen des philosophischen Verstehens und der Gerechtigkeit stehen seit den Anfängen der 
griechischen Philosophie in einem wesentlichen Zusammenhang. Die philosophische Herme-
neutik oder hJrmeneiva hat ihren präphilosophischen Ursprung im griechischen Gott Hermes; 
das platonische Verständnis der Gerechtigkeit (dikaiosuvnh) wiederum geht auf die Göttin Dike 
zurück. Das ambivalente Wesen des Hermes verweist auf die Möglichkeit des Verstehens, aber 
auch der Verführung im Sinne eines missbrauchten Verstehens, womit im Horizont der sokra-
tischen und platonischen Philosophie eigentlich ein Nichtexistieren von Verstehen gemeint ist. 
In der platonischen Philosophie liegen nämlich die Erkenntnis und die ethische Position eng 
beieinander. Fasst man diese ethische Position aber hauptsächlich als Gerechtigkeit auf, so darf 
man diese nicht in etwas reduzierterem Sinn als die Übereinstimmung menschlichen Handelns 
mit den staatlichen Gesetzen verstehen; uns interessiert vielmehr die innere Übereinstimmung 
und Harmonie des Menschen in seiner Seele, und das bedeutet auch die Übereinstimmung des 
Menschen mit der Welt, in der er lebt. Von diesem Standpunkt aus kann man den potenziellen 
hermeneutischen „An-archismus” erneut – diesmal allerdings auf andere Weise – auf die Frage 
der ajrchv ausrichten und aus der Sphäre reiner Theorie in das Wesen selbst des menschlichen 
Lebens transponieren. Dieses Wesen des menschlichen Lebens wird in der platonischen Philo-








Compréhension et finalité de la philosophie platonicienne
Résumé
La question de la compréhension philosophique et celle de la justice sont intrinsèquement liées 
depuis les débuts de la philosophie grecque. La compréhension platonicienne de la justice tire 
son origine pré-philosophique de la déesse Diké, tout comme l’herméneutique tire la sienne 
du dieu grec Hermès. L’ambivalence d’Hermès implique la possibilité de comprendre mais 
aussi la possibilité de séduire ou d’abuser de cette compréhension, ce qui, dans l’horizon de 
la philosophie socratique et platonicienne, signifie en fait un défaut de compréhension. Dans 
la philosophie platonicienne, la connaissance et la position éthique sont intimement liées. Si 
cette position éthique s’entend comme la justice, celle-ci ne doit pas être entendue dans le sens, 
quelque peu réducteur, d’une harmonie entre les actions de l’homme et les lois de l’Etat. Nous 
devrions plutôt nous occuper de l’harmonie intérieure de l’homme et de son âme, ce qui signifie 
en même temps l’harmonie entre l’homme et le monde dans lequel il vit. De ce point de vue, 
« l’an-archisme » herméneutique potentiel peut s’orienter, d’une nouvelle façon cette fois-ci, 
vers la question de l’archè et se transposer d’une simple théorie en existence même de la vie 
humaine, traitée dans la philosophie platonicienne à travers la question de l’âme.
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